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Abstract 
This paper studies the impact of foreign investment on domestic financial markets. It examines 
the empirical validity of some protectionist claims used by regulators to restrict foreign 
investment. These people argue that 1) trading by foreign investors tends to increase market 
volatility more than trading by domestic investors, 2) foreign investors have sophisticated 
investment technology to which domestic investors do not have access so that domestic investors 
tend to "lose" to foreign investors, and 3) foreign investors tend to be short term investors whose 
investments are mostly driven by expectation of short-term gains rather than long-term 
fundamentals such as corporate dividend growth. We find there is no evidence supporting these 
claims from the Japanese experience. To the contrary, we find that foreign investors tend to be 
long-term contrarian players in the market and their presence helps to improve liquidity in the 
Japanese market. Thus, our results support the hypothesis that international free flow of equity 
capital is beneficial to domestic markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Many theoretical and empirical works in finance have demonstrated the fact that 
international diversification brings enormous benefits to portfolio investors.1 A recent economic 
study by Obstfeld (1994) also shows that international diversification allows risk-averse investors 
to take risky projects in developing countries, helping to spur economic growth in these countries. 
Few studies, however, have systematically examined the impact of foreign equity portfolio 
investment on domestic financial markets. This is an important issue, particularly given the fact 
that stock prices of many emerging markets recently have declined dramatically as a result of 
foreign money outflow, causing severe financial disruption to these economies. This raises a 
serious question about whether international "hot money" really facilitates long-term market 
development in emerging markets.2 The presence of foreign investment barriers in many countries 
suggests that government regulators in these countries have serious doubts about the long-term 
benefits of foreign investment. 
Financial authorities in these vulnerable emerging markets often argue that foreign 
portfolio investment would increase market volatility, hence exposing them to unduly high risk. 
Another concern the authorities may have is that the investors in developed markets have 
sophisticated investment technology to which domestic investors do not have access so that 
domestic investors tend to "lose" to foreign investors. This creates a serious political problem 
in many countries, which makes it difficult for open-market reform. Emerging market regulators 
^ee , for example, Bailey and Stulz (1990), Eun and Resnick (1988), Grauer and Hakansson 
(1987), Hardy (1990), Harvey (1995), and Stulz (1987). 
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 "Private-Capital Flows Can Hurt Poor Nations", Wall Street Journal, January 30, 1995. 
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are also concerned that foreign investors tend to be short-term players whose presence in the 
market today may not be warranted tomorrow. As a result, capital controls are observed in many 
countries. Korea, for example, limits foreign ownership to ten percent. For many large stocks 
this limit is reached but the government's process of raising the limit has not been swift. Another 
type of regulation is found in Thailand where foreigners' investment is restricted to a different 
class of shares which are traded on a separate exchange.3 A similar regulation exists in China. 
High withholding taxes in investment gains are another form of restriction against foreign 
investment.4 
In this paper, we study the empirical validity of some of those arguments by examining 
foreign investment behavior in the Japanese stock market. We evaluate and contrast this behavior 
with that of Japanese domestic sectors. The questions we ask are: (1) Do foreign investors 
demonstrate different behavior? Especially, are they short-term oriented in their investment 
horizon? (2) How do domestic and foreign investors fare in their investment results? And (3) Is 
there evidence that foreign investors cause higher volatility in the domestic market? 
There may also be other concerns and claims by regulators of financial markets, such as 
protection of domestic financial institutions against their foreign competitors. Here we focus on 
the above three questions since they are general in nature, and are often asked in the context of 
open-market reforms of emerging markets. 
Of course, the Japanese market is no longer an "emerging" one; its size has increased 
3Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) document capital market segmentation in the Thai stock market. 
4See Harvey (1995) for a description of various capital restrictions in the emerging markets. 
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substantially in the last 30 years. But our data dates back to the early 1970s when the market was 
much smaller and more tightly regulated against foreign investment. Our sample period 
encompasses the gradual deregulation of the Japanese market especially with regard to foreign 
investment. Following a significant amendment to the Foreign Exchange Control Law that took 
effect at the end of 1980, Japan is now, in principle, open to foreign ownership. Reflecting this 
change, foreign ownership in Tokyo Stock Exchange listed firms increased from 2.5% in 1979 
to 6.3% in 1983.5 In addition, as noted later, our data on trading volume show a significant 
increase in trading activities by foreign investors in recent years. By examining the behavior of 
overseas investors in the Japanese market, we can study the impact of foreign investment on 
domestic financial markets. One clarification is in order at this point. We are using more than 
15 years of monthly data to examine long-term behavior of foreign investors and its impact on the 
domestic market. We are, however, not examining short-term (day-by-day or minute-by-minute) 
behavior of foreign investors, such as index futures arbitrage transactions.6 
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 describes data and presents some 
5Tokyo Stock Exchange (1994b). Kang and Stulz (1995) examine foreign ownership in Tokyo 
Stock Exchange listed firms. 
6In the early 1990s Japanese regulators introduced several measures to discourage transactions 
in the stock index futures market on the ground that the arbitrage transactions in the futures 
market are causing excessive volatility in the spot market. Because of the high transactions costs 
and taxes, arbitrage is usually only profitable for proprietary dealings by securities houses (see 
Brenner, Subrahmanyam, and Uno (1989)). Since foreign securities houses are active in the 
futures market, these measures can be partly viewed as regulations against them. As stated in the 
text, we do not address this point. Our definition of foreign investors is long-term players such 
as mutual and pension funds, and proprietary transactions by foreign securities firms are classified 
as "securities firm proprietary dealing (domestic and foreign)." See also Miller (1994) for a 
criticism of Japanese securities regulation. 
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summary statistics on Japanese stock market performance and trading behavior of Japanese and 
foreign investor groups. Section 3 discusses the impact of trading on market volatility by major 
investor groups. Section 4 discusses the application of the market timing test of Henriksson and 
Merton (1981) in evaluating the market timing ability of Japanese and foreign investor groups in 
the Japanese market. Section 5 first presents an approximate present value model in which we 
decompose excess returns into three different components: innovations (or news) about dividend 
growth, interest rates, and future expected returns. We then study the relationships between 
trading behavior and various innovations in security returns. The final section concludes the 
paper. 
2. The Data 
We use data on trading by different types of investors on the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 
1974:07 to 1992:06. The yen amount of purchases and sales during the month are recorded each 
month for proprietary trading of securities firms and trading at their clients' orders. The latter 
is further classified into insurance companies, banks, other financial institutions, investment trusts 
(mutual funds), non-financial corporations, other firms, non-Tokyo Stock Exchange member 
securities firms, individuals, and foreigners. The original data are obtained from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Monthly Statistics (1975-1993). It is compiled from reported trading figures of so-
called "integrated securities firms." The integrated securities firms are large securities houses 
capable of lead-underwriting securities and licensed in all lines of business (proprietary dealing, 
brokerage, sales, and underwriting) in the Tokyo market. Although the data do not contain 
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tradings by small "non-integrated" firms, the proportion of such transactions is relatively small.7 
In order to focus on distinctively different types of investors, we will limit the number of 
investor types and use the data for (1) securities firms (proprietary dealing), (2) insurance 
companies, (3) banks, (4) investment trusts, (5) non-financial corporations, (6) individuals, and 
(7) foreigners. The bank sector represents investment by the banks themselves (up to 5 percent 
of any corporation) and institutional client accounts they manage. While it is not possible to break 
down the two, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of the trading is for client accounts, 
given the stationary nature of the banks' own holdings of equities. The investment trusts are 
essentially the same as mutual funds. The foreigner sector includes both institutions and 
individuals. Again, although it is not possible to divide the two, it is reasonable to consider most 
of it to be institutional, in the form of mutual and pension funds.8 
For monthly aggregate stock returns, we use a value-weighted index (dividend reinvested) 
of the Tokyo Stock Exchange Section I stocks. For short-term interest rates, we use Gensaki 
rates. These data are obtained from Hamao and Ibbotson (1989). The S&P 500 total returns are 
obtained from Ibbotson (1994). 
Table 1 presents trading volumes as a percentage of total trading volume by the "integrated 
security companies." We observe several interesting points. First, many Japanese institutions 
7The percentage of trading volume by integrated firms of total volume was approximately 70% 
in the 1970s. It has increased over the years to account for 90% in 1990s. See Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (1994a). 
Proprietary trading by foreign firms, which was well-noted in the popular press from the late 
1980s especially in connection with the index arbitrage, belongs to category (1) securities firms 
(proprietary dealing). 
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significantly increased their relative trading volume (an indication of increase in overall holdings) 
from 1975 to 1988 while dramatically lowering their trading volume in the post-crash year of 
1991. For example, Japanese bank (corporation) purchases accounted for only 1 % (6%) of total 
purchases in 1975. The number increased dramatically to 19.8% (10.9%) in 1988, while 
dropping significantly to 12.9% (6.5%) in 1991. It is worth noting that, due to the 65% drop in 
overall trading activity, the total purchases of banks (corporations) dropped by an astonishing 78% 
(82.5%) from 1988 to 1991! 
Second, foreign investors were the only major investor group which significantly increased 
its trading share during the post-crash years. Moreover, they were the largest net buyer of 
Japanese equities. Figure 1 presents the trading activity of foreign investors over the entire 
sample period. We can see that foreign transactions were quite limited during the relatively 
restrictive environment of the pre-1980s, accounting for less than 10% of the monthly 
transactions. However, the market share picked up significantly during the 1980s and reached 
a peak of 25% during the post-crash year of 1992, when the Japanese market was overwhelmed 
with pessimism. We can also see from Figure 1 that before the market crash foreign investors 
were quite consistently selling more stocks than they were buying them. This behavior changed 
after the crash, turning into a net purchaser. 
It is worthwhile to note that the percentage of foreign ownership of Japanese stocks 
remained at a rather low level for the entire period. As shown in Figure 1, except for the increase 
after the deregulation of the Foreign Exchange Control Law in December 1980, foreign ownership 
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remained low compared to foreigners' share in trading volume.9 Foreign investors participate in 
the Japanese market much more actively as "traders" than as "stable shareholders." This may 
lead to the conjecture that foreigners are short-term oriented and can cause volatility by their 
trading activities. We examine the validity of this conjecture in the following sections. 
Table 2 presents the correlations of net purchases among various types of investors. We 
observe that foreign investors' net purchases were negatively related to most of Japanese domestic 
investor groups.10 They tend to sell stocks when other Japanese domestic institutional investors 
are buying. Thus, by generally taking the opposite position, foreign investors improve liquidity 
and lower volatility in the Japanese market. In addition, we can see that individual investors in 
Japan also tend to supply liquidity to the market. 
3. Impact on Market Volatility by Foreign Trading 
One of the major concerns of governments around the world about foreign investment in 
domestic equities is that foreign investors tend to be short-term players whose trading activity 
increases market volatility. In the Japanese market, transactions by foreign investors have become 
more active in recent years. There have been several accounts in the popular press that the 
9The year-end holdings data are obtained from Tokyo Stock Exchange (1994b). 
10We note that the net purchase series may not be stationary due to the dramatic rise in price and 
overall shares in the Japanese market. Thus, we have also performed our analysis using the 
difference between log(buy) and log(sell) instead of net purchase. The results are quite robust. 
Thus, we present the net purchase results and make the other results available upon request. 
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behavior of foreign investors is a significant factor determining market movements.11 
To see whether trading activities by foreign investors cause higher volatility, we perform 
the following regression analysis: 
where vt is the monthly volatility for month r, wt is a vector of monthly transactions by various 
major investment groups, and ut is the error term. We include the lagged volatility to take into 
account the persistence in monthly volatilities. It is worth noting that wt in the equation could be 
endogenous. This is because investors' transactions during the month could be affected by the 
return volatility of the month. This endogeneity could cause the wt term to be correlated with the 
error term in the regression. If this is the case, then OLS regressions could be biased and 
inconsistent. 
To solve the endogeneity problem, we use a 3SLS (three-stage-least-squares) instrumental 
variables regression technique, modified from Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), to 
accomplish the estimation task. If the data satisfy the orthogonal condition and other regularity 
conditions in Newey and West (1987), the estimates will be consistent despite the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. 
Intuitively, the estimation procedure is a special case of the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimation technique. In the first stage, a simple instrumental-variables 
nFor example, "Foreign Money Inflow Brings Active Investment," April 10, 1993, "Foreign 
Money Escapes From Tokyo Market, Causing Market Drop," June 22, 1993, "Foreigners 
Actively Buying Export and Hi-Tech Stock," December 17, 1993 (all inNihon Keizai Shimbun 
(Japan Economic Journal)). 
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regression is used to obtain an estimate of (1), ignoring heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. 
In the second and third stages, we use moving averages of the residuals from the first-stage 
regression to calculate a Newey-West adjustment matrix. We then use a generalized-least-squares 
(GLS) method to obtain a more efficient estimate of the autoregression for all periods. A detailed 
description of the estimation procedure is given in the appendix. 
The first row of Table 3 reports the regression of monthly volatility on lagged volatility 
and contemporaneous net purchases (Net Buy) by various groups. Monthly volatility is measured 
by a rolling 25-day variance of daily returns of the Nikkei 225 index.12 We can see that there is 
no evidence that foreign net purchases affect volatility more than net purchases of domestic 
groups. As a matter of fact, foreign net purchases tend to have a smaller impact on volatility 
relative to domestic net purchases. The second row of Table 3 reports the regression of monthly 
volatility on lagged volatility and contemporaneous purchases (Buy) by various groups. We can 
see that there is also no evidence that foreign purchases affect volatility more than purchases of 
domestic groups. The third row of Table 3 reports the same regression using sales. Here we do 
have some evidence that foreign sales tend to increase market volatility more than domestic sales. 
However, the difference in impact between foreigners and Japanese Insurance Firms (or Securities 
Firms) is not statistically significant. Thus, we find little empirical evidence from the Japanese 
experience suggesting that trading by foreign investors tends to increase market volatility more 
than that of domestic groups. The point of this exercise is that although there may have been a 
12Due to data availability, we use daily Nikkei 225 index (instead of the value-weighted index) 
returns to compute this volatility. Nikkei 225 index is a price-weighted average of large and 
representative 225 stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Section I. 
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few instances in which foreign tradings have affected market volatility, we have little systematic 
evidence that foreign tradings tend to increase market volatility more than those of domestic 
groups. 
4. Evaluating Market Timing Performance of Various Investment Groups 
A. Market Timing: A Preliminary Study 
Another major concern about foreign investment for many governments is that foreign 
investors have sophisticated investment technology to which domestic investors do not have 
access. As a result, they have better market timing so that domestic investors tend to "lose" to 
foreign investors. To protect the interests of domestic investors, restrictions are often placed on 
foreign investment in domestic companies. 
To examine this issue, we first plot excess returns and net purchases by major market 
groups in Figure 2.13 We aggregate investors into three large groups: Japanese institutions (1 
through 5 above), Japanese individuals (6), and foreign investors (7). We can see clearly from 
the chart that foreign and domestic individual investors were major net sellers during the booming 
1980s. They sold quite heavily during 1983 - 1990, while Japanese institutions made more and 
more purchases as the market ran up. As a result, foreigners missed major market booms (while 
avoiding heavy losses due to the market decline after 1990). In this sense, we have no evidence 
that foreigners were better market timers. 
13A simple and direct approach to this issue would be to examine the returns on investment by 
various investor groups. However, the return data is not available to us. As a result, we examine 
the relationship between tradings of various groups with Japanese market movements. 
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To look at the market timing issue more closely, we examine the relationship between net 
purchases and future excess returns. We run the following regression for the seven major investor 
groups. 
where PURt is net purchases for month t and is future excess return (in 
excess of short rate) over a one-, three-, or six-month period from month t. This specification 
implies a trading strategy of purchasing stocks based on the forecast of excess returns in the next 
one-, three-, or six-month holding period. 
As can be seen from Table 4, although foreign net purchases appear to be positively related 
to future excess returns at t +1 (c5), the relationship is not significant. Moreover, the coefficients 
c3 on excess returns et+1t+3 and et+lt+6 are negative. There appears to be some evidence that the 
purchases of Japanese banks and investment trusts are positively related to future excess returns. 
Overall, there is no evidence that foreign investors as a group possess superior market timing 
ability. 
B. Market Timing: A Non-parametric Test 
Henriksson and Merton (1981) developed a non-parametric test to evaluate investors' 
market timing performance that only requires the observation of market excess returns and the 
prediction of forecasters. It does not depend on knowledge of the distribution of excess returns 
on the market or any particular model of security valuation. Given that the predictions of 
forecasters are generally unobservable, later studies have tried to use ex post portfolio excess 
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return to proxy for the unobservable ex ante predictions.14 In this paper, we propose to use an 
alternative proxy, the net purchase of stocks, in order to evaluate the market timing performance 
of Japanese institutional and individual investors. 
The intuition behind this proxy is that, in a frictionless market where investors are risk 
neutral and where stock trading only depends on investors' forecasts of future market excess 
returns, investors increase their positions in stocks if they forecast next period stock excess return 
to be positive and reduce or close their position in stocks if they forecast next period stock excess 
return to be negative. Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between stock net purchase and 
investors' predictions of next period market excess returns. 
Following Henriksson (1984), we first define ZJt) to be the one-period return on the 
market portfolio and R(t) to be the one-period return on riskless securities. We also define y(0 
to be investors' investment decision (forecast) variable where y(0 = l if investors decide to 
increase their position during time t -1, and y(0 = 0 if investors decide to reduce their position 
during time t -1. The two probabilities of interest for y(0 conditional on the realized return on 
the market are 
Thus, px(t) is the conditional probability of a correct forecast, given that ZM(t)<R(t), and p2(t) 
is the conditional probability of a correct forecast, given that Z (t)>R(t). Merton (1981) showed 
See, for example, Henriksson (1984). 
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that a necessary and sufficient condition for a forecaster's predictions to have no value is that 
px(t) +p2(t) = 1. The existence of forecasting ability will result in 
Based on the above theoretical results, Henriksson and Merton (1981) proposed the 
following test statistic to test the null hypothesis of px(t) +p2(t) = 1: 
where n
 t is the number of correct forecasts, given ZM<R\ n2 is the number of times forecast that ZM<R 
subtracting nx\ N2 is the number of observations where ZM>R\ and Nx is the total number of 
observations subtracting N2. They have provided asymptotic standard errors for the statistic, thus 
a simple t-test of the null hypothesis could be formed. 
Applying the Merton and Henriksson test, we evaluate the market timing performance of 
various investment groups in the Japanese market, using net stock purchases as proxy for the ex 
ante prediction of forecasters. The results are presented in Table 5. We divide the sample into 
four subperiods so that we can investigate performances during different time periods and study 
the consistency of these performances. The results are thus presented in four panels. In addition 
to evaluating the ability to forecast Japanese stock market returns in excess of the short-term rate 
("Forecast over short rate"), we also evaluate the ability to forecast Japanese stock market returns 
15For a more thorough presentation of this framework, see Merton (1981) and Henriksson and 
Merton (1981). 
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in excess of the S&P 500 returns in dollars.16 
Panel A of Table 5 shows that Japanese banks have the best market timing performance 
while corporations and Japanese individual investors have the worst market timing performance 
during the sample period of 1974:8 - 1992:6. Foreign investors also demonstrated some degree 
of market timing ability but the performance is not statistically significant. When we split the 
sample into two subperiods, 1974:8 - 1983:12 and 1984:1 - 1992:6, we find that securities firms' 
proprietary trading, investment trusts, and corporations have the worst timing performances in 
the first subperiod. Corporations and individual investors have the worst market timing 
performances during the second sample period. Interestingly, we find that foreign investors did 
relatively well in yen returns during the first sample period when there were restrictions on 
foreign investment while they did less well in the second time period when there was considerable 
relaxation of foreign investments. It is easy to see that performances are not consistent over 
time.17 
The Japanese stock market experienced dramatic run-ups in the mid-1980s and sharp 
declines after the beginning of 1990. Thus, it is interesting for us to see the market timing 
performance for various groups during this time period. From Panel D, we can see that the so-
called "Japanese securities power houses" (securities firms) fared the worst during this period of 
turmoil. Foreign investors also missed their target of market timing with respect to excess returns 
16We also evaluated the ability to forecast Japanese stock market returns in excess of the long-
term bond returns, and in excess of S&P 500 returns in yen. The results are qualitatively similar 
to the ones presented here. 
17This is confirmed formally by a simple calculation of correlations of performances over the two 
subperiods. The correlations are negative or close to zero for all measures. 
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in yen. Other groups fared slightly better, but the short sample period prevented us from drawing 
any statistical conclusions. 
In summary, there is little evidence of superior foreign investor market timing abilities. 
It can be said that the Japanese market was never a successful target of exploitation by foreign 
investors. 
5. What Determines Investors' Security Trading? 
Some market regulators claim that foreign investors tend to be short-term investors, whose 
investments are mostly driven by expectation of short-term gains rather than long-term 
fundamentals such as corporate dividend growth. In this section, we examine the validity of this 
claim. 
We begin by examining the relationship between net purchases and market past excess 
returns. We regress net purchases by various groups on their lagged net purchases and past 
returns from month t-l9 t-2, and t -3 . The results are presented in Table 6. We find that, 
unlike some Japanese investor groups, foreign investments are negatively related to past excess 
returns. Thus, foreign investors are generally contrarian investors, who tend to sell after a 
market rally and buy after a market downturn. 
To get a closer look at the impact of different excess return components on stock holdings, 
we use the approximate present value relation of Campbell and Ammer (1993) to decompose 
unexpected excess stock returns into news about future dividends, interest rates, and future excess 
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returns: 
where r is the one-period treasury bill return, e is the excess return on equity (over short rate), 
and d is the log dividend paid. All variables are measured in real terms and in logs, a tilde (~) 
superscript represents an innovation in a variable, and a delta (A) designates a first difference. 
Thus Ad is the log change in real dividends. We use Et to denote expectations formed at the end 
of period t, while (Et+1 - E) is the revision in expectations given new information arrived during 
period t + 1. The parameter p is a constant of linearization that is slightly less than one.19 
For convenience, we define a simpler notation to refer to the three news components 
above: 
Each term in (3) corresponds to one of the summations in (2). Equation (3) says that, ceteris 
paribus, news that dividends will grow more rapidly in the future would have a positive impact 
18An approximate intertemporal identity is derived by taking a first-order Taylor expansion of an 
accounting identity for the log one-period return, computing the forward solution of the resulting 
difference equation in the log of the dividend-price ratio, and applying expectations operators. The 
only assumption we make here is to impose a consistency condition on expectations that is 
somewhat weaker than rational expectations. For details, see Campbell and Ammer (1993) or 
Campbell and Mei (1993). 
19It is approximately equal to the inverse of the mean of the dividend yield on stocks, or about 
0.9988 for the Tokyo Stock Exchange Section I index. 
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on today's stock return. On the other hand, an unexpected increase in the future expected excess 
returns (risk premiums) generates an immediate capital loss. Similarly, positive revisions to 
future interest rate expectations reduce the current return on equity. 
In order to determine the relative importance of dividends, real interest rates and future 
expected excess return innovations on asset returns, Panel A of Table 7 decomposes the variance 
of unexpected asset returns into six components. The six components are the variance associated 
with news about future cash flows (Var(ed)), the variance due to news about future real interest 
rates (Var(er)), and news about future expected returns (Var(ee)), and the covariances among 
these three news components. For easier interpretation, the six terms are given as ratios to the 
variance of the unexpected excess asset returns so that they sum to one. From Panel A, one can 
observe that a large portion of the variance in unexpected returns is explained by news (or 
changing expectations) about future dividends for the Tokyo Stock Exchange Section I stocks. 
More specifically, news about future dividends accounts for 88.6% of the total variance of 
unexpected returns in a VAR(2) model and 86% of the total variance in a VAR(3) model for 
Tokyo I stocks.20 The variation of real interest rates has a small impact on the variation of 
unexpected excess stock returns (accounting for 10.4% of the Var{e) under VAR(2)). The 
variance of news about future expected returns impacts on the variance of stock returns to a 
20See Appendix for the VAR specification and the computation of the return components. Here, 
we first perform a test of lag length of the VAR process. A simple Wald-test of the hypothesis 
that the coefficients on the last lagged variables are jointly zero is rejected for VAR(2) but not for 
VAR(3). Thus, the last lag is significant for VAR(2) but not significant for VAR(3). Therefore 
either a VAR(2) or VAR(3) process should be utilized in decomposing the variance of asset 
returns. 
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greater extent (24.1 %). 
Given the dynamics of asset returns, our next step is to study the trading (net purchase) 
behavior of Japanese market investors in relation to the dynamics of stock market returns. To be 
more specific, given that the return generating process is exogenous, we relate security trading 
to innovations about stocks' future dividends and expected future returns. 
Panel B of Table 7 studies the relationship between net stock purchases and various 
components of excess stock returns. We can see from panel B.l that the net purchases of 
investment trusts, corporations, and individuals are negatively correlated with future dividend 
growth, while the net purchases of securities firms' proprietary trading, insurance firms, and 
foreign investors are positively correlated with future dividend growths. This is quite interesting. 
Since news about future dividend growth reflects changes in the long-term value of Japanese 
stocks, our results suggest that relative to some Japanese market participants, foreign investors 
tend to be more long-term oriented, contrary to the claim that foreign investors tend to be short-
term investors who ignore long-term fundamentals. 
Panel B.l also presents evidence on the correlation between net stock purchases and news 
about future excess returns. Again, we see no evidence that foreign investors behave differently 
from domestic groups. 
Panel B.2 presents the relationship between net stock purchases and various lagged 
components of excess stock returns. We can see that the net purchases of investment trusts, 
corporations, and individuals are negatively correlated with lagged future dividend growths, while 
the net purchases of security firms, insurance companies, banks, and foreign investors are 
positively correlated. We also have some weak evidence that foreign net purchases are related 
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to lagged news about future excess returns. It is worth noting here that, when we regress net 
purchases on various components of excess returns, we find that these components explain only 
a small fraction of the variation in net purchases.21 
6. Conclusions 
This paper develops a comprehensive framework for analyzing the impact of foreign 
investment on domestic financial markets. First, we develop a three-stage-least-square estimation 
approach to examine the impact of foreign and domestic trading on market volatility. Second, we 
use net purchases of securities as a proxy for investors' forecasts of future excess returns, and 
apply the market timing test of Henriksson and Merton (1981) to evaluate the market timing 
performance of various investment groups in the Japanese market. Third, using the Campbell and 
Shiller (1988) approximate present value model, we decompose excess stock return innovations 
into news about future excess returns, dividend growths, and interest rates. We then study the 
relationship between different news components and foreign and domestic trading behaviors. 
We find that foreign investment improves liquidity in the Japanese market. We find there 
is little empirical evidence that trading by foreign investors tends to increase market volatility any 
more than trading of domestic groups. There is also little evidence of superior foreign investor 
market timing abilities. Thus, the claim of exploitation of domestic investors by foreign investors 
has no empirical support. There is some weak evidence that foreign investment is sensitive to 
21We have also studied the relationships among stock buying and selling activities with current 
and lagged components of stock excess returns. The results are similar to what we find for net 
purchase. These results are available upon request. 
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long-term dividend news, contrary to the claim that foreign investors primarily aim at short-term 
gains while ignoring long-term fundamentals. Thus, we conclude that the long-term impact of 
foreign investment is mostly positive for the Japanese equity market. Therefore, our results 
support the view that international free flow of equity capital is beneficial to domestic markets. 
Before drawing any policy implications from our conclusions, it is important to remember 
that the Japanese equity market is highly regulated. We also need to remember that, despite the 
fact that foreign investment plays an important role in the Japanese equity market, foreign 
ownership still accounts for less than 10% of total Japanese shares. As a result, our conclusions 
may not apply to many emerging markets which lack a rigorous regulatory system and a large 
domestic investment base to cushion the sudden outflow of foreign investment. Thus, although 
our results support the general theme of the GATT agreement that free trade in the financial 
service sector (especially international free capital flow) is beneficial to domestic markets, we 
caution against using the results to push for full and immediate opening of financial markets in 
less developed countries. 
We view this study as a first step towards understanding the impact of foreign investment 
on domestic financial markets. Our contribution to the international finance literature is not its 
conclusion but a new framework for identifying the issues and systematically studying them. Our 
work provides future researchers with some useful information about data collection, econometric 
modeling and estimation procedures. It also provides some direction for future research, such as 
the need to develop a more comprehensive framework to evaluate the costs and benefits of foreign 
investment and the regulatory policy issue of how to balance the need for attracting foreign capital 
and maintaining domestic market stability. We hope our work will stimulate more theoretical and 
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empirical work in this area. 
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Appendix 
The three-stage-least-square instrumental variables estimation is given in the following 
framework. We denote: 
as Nx 1 vectors of observations for the monthly volatility. 
Denote the variables on the right side of equation (1) as e as an N x 1 
vector of ones, YA is the lagged monthly volatility and Wis the vector of monthly transactions. 
' as the transformed error terms, and Then (1) can be written 
as 
Since W_2 are orthogonal to the error terms in (Al), the following qualify as instrumental 
variables 
To estimate (Al), we use a linear 3SLS procedure which is quite similar to the 
conventional 3SLS procedure for estimating simultaneous equations. In the first stage, a 
generalized instrumental variable estimation procedure is used to obtain a consistent estimate of 
B of equation (Al): 
Using the above results, we then construct a more efficient estimate of B in the second and 
third stage: 
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in which G is the covariance matrix of TV. See Newey and West (1987) for the calculation of 
G. The variance-covariance matrix of B is given by The 
estimate of B given by (A3) is consistent despite the correlation between the autoregressors and 
the error terms, and the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. As pointed out by 
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), the consistency is based mainly on the orthogonal 
condition that the error terms are uncorrelated with the instrumental variables used in estimating 
(Al). It is a special case of Hansen's (1982) GMM consistent estimator. 
In order to implement our decomposition, we need to construct empirical proxies for the 
various excess return components in equation (3). To do this, we assume that zt is a vector of 
state variables which includes (et,rt) as its first two elements. zt also includes the relative bill rate 
(the current short term rate subtracted by its twelve months moving average), the term spread (the 
difference in the long-term government bond yield and the Gensaki rate), the dividend yield, and 
the industrial production growth rate. Next we assume that: where w is 
innovation in zt+1. Under the above assumptions, it is easy to compute the following: 
Where ex is a L-element column vector whose first element is one and whose other elements are 
all zero. e2 is a L-element column vector whose second element is one and whose other elements 
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are all zero. See Campbell and Hamao (1992), Campbell and Ammer (1993), and Campbell and 
Mei (1993) for the derivation of the above equation and the selection of state variables. 
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